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Abstract
The Turing Machine has two implicit properties that depend on its underly-
ing notion of computing: the format is fully determinate and computations are
information preserving. Distributed representations lack these properties and
cannot be fully captured by Turing’s standard model. To address this limita-
tion a distributed extension of the Turing Machine is introduced in this paper.
In the extended machine, functions and abstractions are expressed extension-
ally and computations are entropic. The machine is applied to the definition
of an associative memory, with its corresponding memory register, recognition
and retrieval operations. The memory is tested with an experiment for storing
and recognizing hand written digits with satisfactory results. The experiment
can be seen as a proof of concept that information can be stored and processed
effectively in a highly distributed fashion using a symbolic but not fully determi-
nate format. The new machine augments the symbolic mode of computing with
consequences on the way Church Thesis is understood. The paper is concluded
with a discussion of some implications of the extended machine for Artificial
Intelligence and Cognition.
Keywords: Turing Machines, distributed computations, computational
trade-offs, computational entropy, computing formats, associative memory,
natural computations
1. Distributed versus Turing Machine Computations
The Turing Machine (TM) and its associated theory of computing provides a
fully adequate and widely accepted model of information processing machines.2
According to the strongest version of Church Thesis all general enough alterna-
tive models are equivalent to Turing’s model which, for this reason, is the most
powerful model of computing in every possible sense. Despite the time that has
passed since its formulation, this thesis is still held as true by the vast majority
of computer scientists.
1lpineda@unam.mx
2For a formal but intuitive discussion of Turing’s model and the aspects of the theory of
computing addressed in this paper see [9].
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However, this claim has been questioned from the perspective of Connec-
tionism and Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). This paradigm sustains that
intelligence emerges from a large number of simple processing units that interact
locally and that representations are distributed over a large set of such units.
Connectionism has also claimed that Turing’s model is limited for capturing
appropriately this kind of computations and cannot model adequately cognitive
processes like perception, memory and language, among many other mental and
motor processes exhibited by biological entities. For instance see the preface of
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) [36] in which this claim was made explic-
itly. Similar claims are made today within the so-called Embodied Cognition
[4] and the enactivist approach to Cognition [12].
The nature of distributed representations is explained by Hinton et al. [18] in
terms of the relation between the basic computing or memory units at the level
of the hardware and the entities they represent: if this relation is one-to-one the
representation is called local. In distributed representations, on their part, this
relation is many-to-many. An entity may be large and may need be represented
by a set of memory units, but the essential aspect of the distinction is that in
local representations the memory allocated to represent a basic unit of content
–a basic concept– is independent of the memory allocated to represent all other
basic entities, while in distributed representations these allocations may overlap
in arbitrary ways.
A side effect of these relations is that entities that have never been input
can nevertheless be represented if they are similar enough to the entities already
in the representation, so distributed representations can form similarity classes
naturally by their inner operations and distributed systems have the capability
to generalize [18]. These effects cannot be expected in local representations.
Whether a representation is local or distributed has a direct impact on mem-
ory. In local representations a particular unit of information is stored in a par-
ticular place that has an address, which is required to store, read or modify the
information. However, human and other biological memories are best thought
as distributed representations where contents are distributed over a large num-
ber of computing or memory units, that are accessed and retrieved by content
[2]. For a discussion of computational models see the introduction of Parallel
Models of Associative Memory [17].
For all these reasons, there is a sense in which Connectionist Systems are
indeed more powerful than the standard TM. The challenge to Church Thesis
depends on whether the format of the TM is local and distributed systems have
for this reason a mode of computing that is essentially different and cannot be
captured by the standard TM model.
However, the claim is obscured in practice because ANNs are normally spec-
ified through arithmetic functions which are Turing computable and are sim-
ulated in standard computers, with standard data structures and algorithms,
using standard programming languages, and these programs are not different in
kind to other standard computer programs. Hence, computations are no longer
performed by simple units that interact locally. Accordingly, either the TM
do support distributed computations after all or distributed computations re-
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duce to local ones. Furthermore, all TMs can be simulated by neural networks
[39], and as ANNs are specified as computable functions, these formalisms are
equivalent in this sense too.
Despite this, the intuition that there is a fundamental opposition between
local and distributed representations and computations is very strong, and
whether this is a genuine distinction has implications on the way Church Thesis
is understood and, more generally, on the underlying notion or concept on which
theories of computing are built up.
In this paper these issues are explored further. In order to ground the discus-
sion and to establish the terminology, the structure and main properties of the
standard Turing Machine are presented in Section 2. Two underlying proper-
ties of the machine, that are called here determinacy of format and information
conservation, are presented and discussed. The determinacy of the format corre-
sponds to the local property of non-distributed representations, but abstracted
away from Connectionism and ANNs connotations. So, the format of the TM
is indeed local. These two properties taken together involve a third negative
property of TMs: these machines are entropy free. The entropy is central to
Shannon’s information theory, and its absence from the standard theory of com-
puting is somehow paradoxical as computers are the paradigmatic information
processing machines.
The main claims of this paper are presented next in Section 3: that there
are symbolic computing formats that are not determinate neither information
preserving; that distributed representations and machines are characterized pre-
cisely by the use of non-determinate formats; that non-determinate formats are
entropic and a notion of computational entropy is required, and that distributed
extensions of the standard TM using non-determinate and entropic formats can
be defined. An instance of such a kind of machine is presented. In this machine
functions and abstractions are expressed extensionally and, unlike the standard
TM in which the algorithms codified in the transition table are fixed along the
computation, the functions and abstractions computed by the extended machine
can be changed by its operations, and the machine is interactive.
An application of the machine to the definition of an associative memory
–which uses a highly distributed representation– is presented in Section 4. This
memory is framed independently of the connectionist paradigm [17] and also
from symbolic associative memories, like semantic networks [34]. Then an ex-
periment on visual memory using the associative memory is presented, where
the represented objects, in this case the digits from 0 to 9, are registered and
recognized with very high precision and recall by a fully parallel and highly dis-
tributed entropic process. The experiment can be seen as a proof of concept of
the possibility of expressing and computing information in a highly distributed
fashion at the symbol level directly.
The implications of the distributed extension of the Turing Machine for the
theory of computing and Church Thesis are discussed in Section 5. This dis-
cussion is started with the notion of mode of computing which is introduced
in order to distinguish TMs, which are symbolic, from other kinds of machines
whose mode of computing is not symbolic. A fundamental trade-off between
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distributed and TM computations is also presented and discussed in this sec-
tion. This trade-off consists in that distributed computations favor expressiv-
ity of extensional information with very effective computation but at the cost
of information loss, while determinate computations, where information is ex-
pressed intensionally, favor precision and information conservation but have to
face the underlying trade-off between expressivity and tractability. This is also
a trade-off between natural computations, which are distributed, and artificial
computations characterized by the TM model.
The implications of the distributed extension of the TM for Artificial Intelli-
gence and Cognition, including the opposition between ANNs and TMs, and also
between natural versus artificial computations are discussed in the conclusion
in Section 6.
2. Structure and Properties of the Turing Machine
The TM is a device for computing functions by mapping their arguments
into their corresponding values through the execution of a fully mechanical
procedure, without human intervention. The constituents of the machine are:
1. A finite set of states Q including a designated initial state q0.
2. A finite set of symbols Σ –the alphabet.
3. A tape with an unlimited amount of cells –can be extended with no limits,
say by its right side– where each cell holds an instance of a symbol of Σ.
4. A finite state control with a local scanner device that is above or inspects
a particular cell at every state.
5. A set of operations O = {R,Wsi∈Σ,Mr,Ml} –read, write symbol s for all
symbols in the alphabet Σ, move right and move left– that are performed
by the scanning device at any given state.
6. A transition function –or transition table– δ : Q×Σ→ (O,Q) mapping a
state and a symbol behind the scanning device into an operation and the
next state of the machine at each computation step.
7. A set of final states F ⊆ Q –some of the states are final.
Algorithms –i.e., the mechanical procedures for finding the values corre-
sponding to the given argument– are codified in the transition function. Algo-
rithms can also be considered as descriptions of their corresponding functions,
and the information codified within the finite state control constitutes inten-
sional information. Strings of symbols on the tape, on their part, represent
particular arguments and values, and constitute extensional information. The
machine is illustrated in Figure 1.
Computations are interpreted in relation to a predefined set of conventions
–including the notation– that gives rise to the notion of standard configuration.
In this, the scanning device is at the left-most symbol of the argument at the
initial state, and at the left-most symbol of the value at the final state, as
illustrated for a particular function –in decimal notation– in Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Turing Machine
The TM model does not impose the restriction that the next state for a
given state and symbol that is currently behind the scanner should be unique,
and when there are more than one the machine is said to be non-deterministic.
Computations in these machines unfold as non-sequential structures (e.g. like
trees) which can be explored sequentially by the same actual machine or by a
set of machines working in parallel where each machine explores a particular
path, but this is a contingency due to idealizations of the abstract model, as
will be seen below.
The TM has not an explicit theory of memory but information is placed in
two kinds of places: 1) the physical substratum in which the transition function
is represented and 2) the tape. The theory is neutral in relation to the nature of
the former but it can be thought of as implemented in the hardware directly (as
it was the case for the first digital computers) or as an internal data structure
interpreted by a basic procedure or algorithm that directs the operations of the
machine, and its structure is commonly represented as a table or a directed graph
–where edges are labeled with symbols and operations that map one state into
the next. This representation determines the particular machine and is fixed
along the computation. The symbols manipulated by the machine, on their
part, are placed on the tape, which is thought of as the memory proper for this
reason. The transition function can be codified on the tape, as was proposed by
Turing in the original presentation of the machine [44], and can be uploaded by
a particular algorithm into the state control, and this machine can in principle
compute all functions, given rise to the Universal Computing Machine. This
notion was later made practical with the notion of stored program of current
computer architectures, so the two kind of places for storing information are
similar except that the memory for storing the transition function is finite, as
all computer programs are finite strings of symbols.
Individual cells hold instance of symbols and sequences of cells store strings
which are the basic units form –here are called “words”– that represent individ-
ual concepts –the basic units of content. For instance, the strings representing
arguments and values of functions are words –the numerals– that represent the
corresponding numbers –the abstract objects. There are then three levels in-
volving the memory that need to be clearly distinguished:
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Figure 2: Standard Configurations
1. The cells or memory units constitute the medium of the representation,
which is a physical hardware substratum.
2. The strings of symbols held on such medium which are the formal objects
manipulated by the machine.
3. The units of content or basic concepts that are the meanings assigned to
strings or words by human interpreters.
Strings are conventionally separated by the blank character (although this
typographic convention is contingent), and the tape can hold several words at
the same time, so composite units of form, like sentences, are interpreted as the
corresponding composite units of content –the propositions expressed by the
sentences. This gives rise to an alternative standard configuration in which the
tape has a sequence of words at the initial state and the machine halts when
the whole of the string has been inspected and a final accepting state has been
reached depending on whether the input belongs to a given language. In this
configuration the TM computes a characteristic function (i.e., set membership)
and there is a TM for every formal language.3 This perspective highlights that
the format of the Turing Machine is linguistic.
There are three very important assumptions of the model:
1. Cells on the tape can be added as needed, which means that memory is
unlimited.
2. Computations are performed instantly, so there are no limitations in com-
puter power.
3. The machine never malfunctions.
For these reasons the Turing Machine is an abstract model independent of the
construction and physical properties of actual machines. In particular, the TM’s
model is neutral to whether computations are deterministic or non-deterministic
3For a classical presentation see [19].
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and to how many steps or how much memory is required to complete the com-
putation, which are questions related to the complexity of algorithms, but not
to whether functions can be computed effectively or intuitively.
The Turing Machine provides a mechanism for finding the values of all argu-
ments of all computable functions –which can be computed intuitively by people
or machines. There are three cases:
1. If the machine halts in the standard configuration the argument has the
value represented by the word in the final state.
2. If the machine halts in a configuration different from the standard one,
the value of the function for the given argument is not defined and the
function is partial.
3. If the machine does not halt the value of the function for the given argu-
ment is not defined and the function is partial too.
Condition 3 requires to know in advance whether the machine will halt for
the given argument. This can be known by God, because if the machine does
not halt immediately it will never halt at all. However, mortals need a machine
to this effect, the halting machine, that has as its arguments the particular
machine (i.e., its id or its description) and the argument in question, and has as
its value say 1 if such machine halts for such argument and 2 if it does not. The
definition of this machine is known as the halting problem. There are machines
that never halt and that can be known by inspection of their structure, but it is
known that the halting problem for an arbitrary function and argument cannot
be solved. The halting problem is an instance of a non-computable function,
and there are several functions that are not computable. These are the limits
of the theory of computability in the sense of the Turing Machine.
Other general models that use symbolic manipulation as their mode of com-
putation, like the theory of recursive functions, the Von Neumann architecture
or Abacus computations [9] and the λ-calculus, are equivalent to the Turing
Machine, in the sense that the description of every TM can be translated or
reduced into a description in the alternative theory and vice versa for all well-
formed descriptions in these formalisms. Consequently all functions that can be
computed in any of these formalisms can be computed in all the others. These
results motivated Church Thesis which states that the Turing Machine computes
the set of functions that can be computed by any other general enough model of
computing, which also corresponds to the set of functions that can be computed
intuitively by people (given enough time and paper). Furthermore, ANNs are
TMs, as discussed above, and TMs are ANNs [39, 42], so these formalisms are
equivalent, providing additional support to Church Thesis.
2.1. Determinacy of the Format
An implicit assumption of Turing’s model is that the format of the infor-
mation that is placed in the tape is fully determinate. This is the restriction
that if an instance symbol belongs to an instance word, it cannot belong to
any other word in the tape: if si ∈ wj then si /∈ wk for all k 6= j. So, any
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given word uses memory units that are independent of the memory units used
by all other words. Instance symbols are like sub-atomic particles that form
words, the atomic representational units. Of course, composite units of form,
like phrases or sentences, use the cells that are used by their constituent ba-
sic units or by other embedded or subsumed composite units. Substrings, like
syllables, carry no content by themselves and can be thought of as sub-atomic
particles. In case such particles do carry meanings, such substrings become the
atoms that are combined in the construction of a composite word, which is no
longer a basic unit of form and content for this reason. This very basic conven-
tion allows that phrases and sentences are built up by composition but not by
superposition (or overlap), and that the meaning of a composite structure is a
function of the meaning of its parts and its mode of combination: the principle
of compositionality.
A word with the concept that it expresses can be thought of as a “capsule”
that is independent of all others, and relations between concepts need to be
expressed through additional words, like verbs or prepositions. Conversely, a
composite structure can be decomposed into its constituent parts, and the de-
terminacy of the format allows analysis (e.g., parsing an string in relation to a
given grammar).
Determinacy also guarantees that erasing a word from the tape or moving
it to another location will not affect the integrity of other words. The inde-
pendence of the basic units of form and content underlies that memory objects
in TM have a place and, in particular, the metaphor of memory as a “chest
of drawers” implemented in Random Access Memory (RAM) of standard com-
puter architectures. For all this, TM representations are local as opposed to
distributed as discussed above in Section 1.
The determinacy of the format does not conflict with non-deterministic ma-
chines and these notions should not be confused. For highly-expressive languages
strings may even be ambiguous (i.e., have more than one interpretation), but
it is never the case that the same memory cell or instance symbol is shared
by more than one word and the format of non-deterministic machines is fully
determinate.
2.2. Information Conservation
Another implicit assumption of Turing’s model is that the machine never
loses information in computations. This is a property of memory and data
bases, as what is registered is exactly what is recovered. More generally the
property can be appreciated in the architecture of the machine directly: 1) the
transition table in the control state –that defines the particular machine– is
fixed along the computation and 2) every symbol that is written on a cell of the
tape is the same that will be read the next time the scanner visits such cell.
Information loss should not be confused with information transformation.
Writing, modifying or erasing a symbol or a word on the tape is a part of al-
gorithms, and transforming information is the substance of computations. In
particular, erasing a word consists on writing the blank symbol on the corre-
sponding cells. In a thermodynamics analogy, information is to energy, com-
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puting operations are to work, and the Turing Machine as a whole is within
an information “Control Volume”, as illustrated in Figure 3. In the same way
that the Law of Conservation of Energy states that energy is never created or
destroyed but only transformed within a control volume, information is never
created or destroyed but only transformed by the Turing Machine.
Information conservation should also be distinguished from reversibility. In
one sense of this term, computations are reversible –or invertible– if f−1(f(x)) =
x, for all x. Reversibility can be achieved by concatenating the machine that
computes a function with the one that computes its inverse, which are differ-
ent machines. However, some functions have and some lack inverses and not
all computations are reversible, but this property and information conservation
are different notions. In another related sense the TM is not reversible because
the transition function in its finite state control does not have an inverse, so
from looking at a particular state it is not possible to know the previous one;
however, if the machine does not have this information in its transition table
in the first place, it cannot lose it in computations. Furthermore, computations
can be made reversible in this latter sense too [7, 1]. There is another sense of
reversibility that refers to the composition and decomposition of strings with-
out information loss, which is allowed by the determinacy of the format, and
reversibility in this sense is information preserving.
2.3. Computational Entropy
Determinacy and information conservation underly a negative property of
TMs: these machines are entropy free and, consequently, “entropy” is not a
theoretical term in the theory. The entropy is the expected value of the in-
formation content of a message in a communication system or a sentence in a
language, so computers do not take into account or make use of the amount of
information that is carried by the representations that they hold. This should be
somehow paradoxical because although computers are the paradigmatic infor-
mation processing machines and the entropy is the central notion in Shannon’s
information theory, the entropy is not considered in computations. The rea-
son is that entropy can also be thought of as the degree of determination of
the content of the message or representation. If this is fully determinate the
entropy is zero. Functions, the objects of computation, are fully determinate
and the representations expressing them are maximally informative. So the en-
tropy of these mathematical objects is zero and this notion is not needed. For
the same reason, these representations can never lose information by the actual
operations of the machine. Hence, the Turing Machine is a maximally efficient
information processing machine, a kind of “perpetual moving machine”. This
is another implicit assumption of the mode of computation of the TM and its
equivalent formalisms.
This should not be confused with the fact that computers compute the en-
tropy of computer applications, which is done all the time. For instance, com-
puting the entropy of corpora or data sets in natural language or text processing
applications is commonly required. Similarly for machine learning algorithms
that use the entropy of the data as a main parameter, like in the construction of
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Figure 3: “Control Volume” of TMs
decision trees. A large number of application domains involve the entropy, but
this should not be confused with the entropy of the representations expressing
the knowledge of such domains themselves.
The computational entropy should neither be confused with the physical
entropy of analogical computers that use physical modes of computing (e.g.,
[40]). The claim here is that the symbolic manipulation mode of computing
does not involve information entropy, and that for this reason “entropy” is not
a theoretical term in the standard theory of Turing Machines and computability.
2.4. Final remarks on Turing Machines
The Turing Machine is an abstract device that is meant as an ideal model of
computing that captures the essential aspects of actual computers. In particular
the interaction with the world is left to implementations. Once the computation
is started the machine takes full control of the tape until the final state is
reached, and the information is read or written when the machine is in an
“idle” state, between the final state of the previous computation and the initial
state of the next one, and once a computation is required, a start signal has to
be made. The assumption is that other agents, people or machines, can write
and read the contents of the tape, which is placed in the input and output
standard configurations at the interaction points, and that particular machines
can be switched for performing complex computations at these points too, but
these considerations are not part of the abstract model. The need to consider the
interaction including unforeseen inputs, the possibility that the machine changes
its behavior or evolve over time, and the infinity of operations and continuos
input streams, have motivated proposals for extending the basic model [27, 28];
however, the need to characterize distributed representations at the functional
and computational level seems to be still pending.
3. Distributed Extension of the Turing Machine
There are formats that lack the properties of determinacy and information
conservation. This is illustrated by the crossword, in which a 2-D grid instead
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Figure 4: Indeterminacy and information loss
of a tape is used as the representation medium. This format does not satisfy
determinacy by definition as the symbols at the intersections belong to more
than one word. Furthermore, erasing a word may affect the integrity of the
words that intersect with it, and there is information loss. These phenomena
are illustrated in Figure 4.
The lack of determinacy and information conservation may be seen as a
limitation of the computing format; however, whenever a cell of the medium
contributes to two or more units of form at the same time, a relation between
such units –possibly with their associated units of content– is established at the
level of the format. This is the basic property of distributed representations.
Or more directly, a representation is distributed precisely when its underlying
computing format lacks determinacy. Distributed representations capitalize the
increased expressive power provided by the shared units, but basic units of
form and content are no longer independent. In distributed representations
the reversibility of composition and decomposition is limited, and hence the
capability of analysis. For all this, the metaphor of storing information in a
chest of drawers does not longer apply.
In order to study further computations with an indeterminate format the
Turing Machine is extended as follows:
1. The finite state control is extended with an n × m Control Grid Gφ.
2. The tape is extended into an n × m External Grid Gψ.
3. The scanner is extended to a set of n × m scanners aligning the corre-
sponding cells of Gφ and Gψ.
4. The content of the cells of both Gφ and Gψ are symbols of an alphabet
including the mark X and the blank B.
5. A set of grid operations {τ , υ,...} mapping the contents of the cells of Gφ
and Gψ from the initial into a final state, such that for all cells i, j:
(a) Gφ,sf (i, j) = τ(Gφ,s0(i, j), Gψ,s0(i, j))
(b) Gψ,sf (i, j) = υ(Gφ,s0(i, j), Gψ,s0(i, j))
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Figure 5: Distributed Computing Machine
Similar operations can be defined between cells and columns, and columns
and columns.
The extended machine subsumes the standard one –which does not use the
control grid– and the move operations can be implemented by selecting a par-
ticular scanning device locally, so standard algorithms can be defined. Although
this functionality is not defined in the present description, it can be added so
that a set of scanners can be turned on and off at particular states. Operations
between cells such that the content of a cell of the control grid in the next state
is a function of its content in the present state, the content of the corresponding
cell in the external grid and the contents of the neighboring cells in the control
grid, as in computational retinas [11] or diagrammatic processors [3, 5], can also
be defined, although this kind of functionality is neither explored further in this
paper. The extended machine is illustrated in Figure 5.
In the basic mode of operation, the control grid Gφ holds a function repre-
sented discretely in a table notation instead of the algorithm in the transition
table of the TM, as illustrated in Figure 6. Columns correspond to arguments
and rows to values, and a mark on a cell at the intersection between a column
and a row represents the value of the corresponding argument. A function is
defined if there is at most one mark in each column. The function is defined
in the state of the cells, and the arguments, values and the function index in
Figure 6 are meta-data for illustration purposes only.
For the operation of the machine we assume that there is an infinite supply
of control and external grids for the specification of finite discrete functions of an
arbitrary number of arguments and values. So, there is no memory limitation.
As all pairs of n arguments and m values are enumerable, all total and partial
discrete functions are enumerable and can be computed in this format. The
enumeration of the functions represented in a grid of size n ×m is as follows:
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Figure 6: Diagrammatic representation of discrete functions
Figure 7: Function Evaluation
Let fk be a function in the enumeration, where the function index k is a numeral
of n digits in base m + 1. The index is composed by the concatenation of the
subscripts of the values vj for all the arguments ai, such that ki = j if fk(ai) = vj
and ki = 0 if fk(ai) is undefined. Total functions can be identified easily as they
have no 0s included in their indices. The number of total and partial functions
is (m + 1)n. The table in Figure 6 illustrates the representation of the total
function f1247 where n = 4 and m = 7.
As in the Turing Machine, functions are evaluated in relation to a standard
configuration. For instance, the input and output standard configurations for
finding the value of the third argument of function f1247 are illustrated in Figure
7. The evaluation proceeds by selecting the column of Gφ (up grid) indexed by
the mark that corresponds to the argument at the bottom row of Gψ (down
grid) in the standard input; erasing the mark in Gψ; selecting the mark in the
selected column of Gφ and copying such mark back into corresponding cell in
Gψ to render the value in the standard output configuration. In this notation
all functions are evaluated by this procedure and the format does not require
the definition of specific algorithms for particular functions.
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3.1. Distributed Computations
The potential of the extended machine comes from its capability to sup-
port distributed representations that can be computed in a fully parallel way
through direct cell-to-cell operations involving a finite and small number of
steps. Discrete functions are considered the basic units of form or “words” and
as concepts are represented through functions, these are also the basic units of
content. The extensional representation of these objects in both Gφ and Gψ
permits the simultaneous representation of more than one word at the same
time, like in the crossword. For this, functions interact and the representation
becomes distributed. Following the analogy of writing and erasing words in the
cross words, we define the corresponding operations that we call abstraction and
reduction. Information is input into Gφ through Gψ. The specification of the
operations states the information in Gψ and Gφ both at the initial and final
states.
3.1.1. Abstraction
The abstraction operation reads the information in Gψ and overlaps it with
the information in Gφ. In order to support interactivity the external grid Gψ
is reset to blanks at the end of the operation, so an external agent can write
on it the next function or abstraction to be input directly. Also, as part of the
standard input configuration Gφ is empty at the start of the computation. The
definition of the abstraction operation is:
Definition 1. Abstraction
For all cells i, j and time k,
1. Gφ,tk+1(i, j) = Gφ,tk(i, j) ∨Gψ,tk(i, j)
2. Gψ,tk+1(i, j) = 0
We refer to the contents of these operations as Γφ = λφ(Γφ,Γψ) and Γψ =
λψ(Γφ,Γψ) respectively. Also, a function f in Gφ is an abstraction Γφ and a
function g in Gψ is an abstraction Γψ.
The sequential application of two abstraction operations is illustrated in Fig-
ure 8. In the notation a blank space is a B in a cell or 0 for logical operations.
In this example the content of Gφ is indeterminate when the two functions have
been input, as all arguments but the third have two possible values. Indetermi-
nate representations can be used to solve a system of equations by inspection:
the solution is the value of the fully determinate argument (i.e., in this case
the third one) which corresponds to the intersection of the lines representing
the two functions in a graphical representation. The computation is a direct
operation on the representation.
Abstractions can be evaluated by a standard procedure, but unlike functions
that produce a determinate value, the values of the arguments with more than
one mark in the corresponding column are indeterminate. For instance, f(a2) =
v2 ∨ v6 at t3 in Figure 8. The larger the terms in the disjunction the larger the
indeterminacy.
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Figure 8: Abstraction
The abstraction operation modifies the function computed by the machine,
extending the functionality of the standard TM in this way too. The operation
involves also that the machine is interactive in the sense that inputing data from
the external grid does impact on the definition of the mathematical object that
is been computed, and for the same reason the machine may evolve along the
computation. This is possible due to the nature of the extensional information
manipulated by the machine, in opposition to the standard TM in which algo-
rithms encapsulate intentional information which cannot be modified along the
computation.
The operation also illustrates that the basic object of computation of the
extended distributed machine is the abstraction, which is a relation. The func-
tion is a particular kind of relation in which all arguments are fully determinate.
The relation, on its part, is a non-determinate object as the arguments are as-
sociated to a number of values. Functions in distributed representations are like
sub-atomic particles or features, that are abstracted upon by superposition in
the construction of abstractions, which are the atoms representing individual
concepts or units of content.
The operation also shows that in the extended machine the objects of com-
putation are also the memories. The data in the external grid does enrich the
content of the object being computed in an abstraction operation, and it is no
longer passive data, like the extensional information placed on the tape in the
standard TM, and the distinction between programs and data is blurred in the
distributed machine.
3.1.2. Information Enrichment
The extension of the set of functions produced by the abstraction operation is
augmented with information due to the geometric properties of the format. This
is illustrated in Figure 8 where Γ(1∨2)(2∨6)4(7∨5) = λφ(Γ1247,Γ2645) contains not
two but eight functions: all functions that can be formed by taking each possible
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Figure 9: Information enrichment
value for each argument. Each function corresponds to one of the eight paths
that can be formed from the first to the last argument in Gφ, as illustrated in
Figure 9. The segments in solid lines correspond to the overt functions and the
ones in dotted lines to the additional information provided by the abstraction.
The additional functions are very similar to the abstracted ones and overlap
with them in most of the segments, and the enrichment is circumscribed but do
provide a generalization space. In an analogy with inductive learning, a general
–but enclosed– class is generated out of a number of concrete instances; however
the information enrichment is due to the format but not to the content of the
instance objects, and differs in this regard from machine learning algorithms,
including ANN, where the generalization is explained in terms of similarity
measures or some kind or another. This effect of information enrichment due to
the format has been labeled within diagrammatic reasoning as free-rides (e.g.,
[38]).
3.1.3. Reduction
The reduction operation extracts the function or abstraction in the external
grid Gψ out of the control grid Gφ. The operation proceeds in two steps: first,
a test to check whether Γψ is included in Γφ is performed. If the test is satisfied
the function or abstraction in Gψ is erased from the abstraction in Gφ.
The inclusion test is defined as a material implication between the abstrac-
tions in both grids (i.e., Γψ → Γφ is true). If the test is satisfied the information
content of both cells remain the same. Otherwise, the content of the control grid
is not altered but the external grid is set to blanks. This convention indicates
that the test failed and prepares the input buffer for a new test.
The second part faces the problems of erasing a word in a crossword: If the
functions in Gφ interact, erasing one has a side effect that the other is altered
too, and there is information loss. The dillema is illustrated in Figure 10 where
the function f1247 in Gψ should be erased from Gφ.
In general, reduction should be thought of in terms of an optimization prob-
lem with two conflicting objectives:
1. Extract as much information as possible of the function or abstraction in
Gψ out of Gφ.
2. The remaining function or abstraction in Gφ should be minimally affected.
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Figure 10: Reduction and indeterminacy
For this particular setting the problem is addressed with a simple heuristics:
for each column, if all cells of Gφ and Gψ are equal, it is not known what
objects (functions or abstractions) contributed to the construction of Γφ, so
leave the column in Gφ as it is; otherwise subtract the content of the column
of Gψ out of the corresponding column of Gφ, as Γψ must have contributed to
the construction of Γφ. Finally, the content of Gφ is copied out into Gψ. That
is, Γψ is a key or an index to retrieve Γφ. With these considerations reduction
is defined as follows:
Definition 2. Reduction
1. Inclusion test: For all cells i, j if Gψ,tk(i, j)→ Gφ,tk(i, j) (material impli-
cation) is true then Gψ,tk+1(i, j) = Gψ,tk(i, j); otherwise Gψ,tk+1(i, j) = B.
In any case Gφ,tk+1(i, j) = Gφ,tk(i, j).
2. Reduction: For all columns i if Gφ,tk(i) = Gψ,tk(i) then Gφ,tk+1(i) =
Gφ,tk(i) = Gψ,tk(i) and Gψ,tk+1(i) = Gψ,tk(i); otherwise Gφ,tk+1(i) =
Gφ,tk(i)−Gψ,tk(i) (i.e., set difference between columns) and Gψ,tk+1(i) =
Gφ,tk(i). We refer to the content of these operations as Γφ = βφ(Γφ,Γψ)
and Γψ = βψ(Γφ,Γψ) respectively.
This definition is illustrated in Figure 11.
The indeterminacy of the format has as a consequence that reduction is not
information preserving. Information conservation requires that βφ(λφ(Γφ, Γψ),
Γψ) = Γφ for all Γφ and Γψ always holds. However this is not the case in general
as illustrated by the following example: βφ(λφ(Γ2∨4, Γ2), Γ2) = βφ(Γ2∨4, Γ2)
= Γ4 but Γ2∨4 6= Γ4. Hence, reduction involves information loss.
The distributed machine also differs from the standard TM in that reduction
does modify the abstraction or function that is computed, and the distributed
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Figure 11: Reduction
machine is interactive and may evolve due to this latter operation too. In the
metaphor of memory as a chest of drawers, a drawer may be selected and its
content can be read, leaving the drawer intact, but if the drawer is needed to
store a different content, it has to be erased without affecting the contents of
other drawers. This is what cannot be guaranteed in distributed systems, where
information extraction becomes a destructive operation involving information
loss.
3.2. Entropy of the computing format
Entropy is a measure of the amount of indeterminacy in information theory:
the larger the information content the lower the entropy and vice versa. Here,
the computational entropy is defined as the normalized average of the amount
of indeterminacy of the arguments in an abstraction. A function assigns a single
value to all arguments, hence it is a fully determinate object and its entropy is
zero. Partial functions have one or more unmarked columns, but the column
index in such columns is fully determined too (i.e., 0), so the entropy of a partial
function is also zero.
In the case of abstractions the degree of indeterminacy of an argument is
inverse to its possible values. Let vi be the number of values (i.e., the marked
cells in column i), xi = 1/vi and n the number of arguments in abstraction Γ.
In case the function is partial and vi = 0 for column i, the corresponding xi = 1.
We define e(Γ), the entropy of abstraction Γ, as follows:
Definition 3. Entropy of an abstraction
e(Γ) = −1/n∑ni=1 log2(xi)
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The format of the Turing Machine is fully determinate and it does not involve
the entropy. However, the notion becomes useful when an indeterminate format
is incorporated.
4. Associative Memory
The extended distributed machine can be used to model an associative mem-
ory where contents are addressed through associations (e.g., [2]). Artificial as-
sociative memories have been thought of as transfer functions were contents are
represented as vectors, and have been designed and implemented as artificial
neural networks trained with standard supervised machine learning methods
[20, 17]. Associative memories have been also modeled within the semantic
networks paradigm (e.g., [34]) where concepts and their relations are repre-
sented as nodes and edges of a directed graph respectively, and associations are
established through the paths between nodes. However, these graphs are repre-
sented through symbolic expressions within the standard symbol manipulation
paradigm, and do not constitute distributed representations.
For the definition of the associative memory with the extended distributed
machine the following considerations are taken into account:
1. The concepts or knowledge objects to be stored are represented by func-
tions and abstractions (i.e, the objects of computations).4
2. The external grid Gψ is used as an input and output buffer to place the
objects to be registered, recognized or retrieved from the memory.
3. The control grid Gφ is used as the associative memory proper.
4. The units of form and content are functions and abstractions in the same
format, contents in the memory Gφ are accessed directly through contents
in the grid Gψ and, consequently, the memory is associative.
The objects or scenes to be stored in the memory are characterized in terms
of their salient features, such that each feature is characterized in turn by a
set of attributes with their corresponding values. Highly abstract feature-value
structures appropriate for particular domains and modalities can be obtained
through current deep learning techniques [6, 23, 24]. With this considerations we
define a concrete image of an object or scene as the abstraction of the functions
characterizing its salient features at a particular situation (e.g., in space and
time). To capture a more stable representation we define an abstract image as
the abstraction of a set of concrete images. So, for instance, a visual scene can
be captured by the abstraction of a number of concrete images produced within
a short period of time, or through a number of variations of these objects due
to observation points, illumination conditions, etc.
4A discrete function of n arguments can be thought of as a vector in a space of n dimensions,
and the representation of contents in the present theory is analogous to the one used in
associative memories modeled with neural networks.
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There is a supply of associative memory registers of arbitrary cardinalities
only limited by the number of cells or basic processing units of the memory
system as a whole, which is finite. So, a number of images can be stored in
the memory. We also consider that salient features of objects and scenes may
depend on the modality through which a cognitive agent perceives such object or
scene, and particular associative memory registers may be associated to specific
modalities of perception. Associative memories can also represent modality
independent concepts in terms of attribute-value pairs, although this is not
addressed further in this paper.
The present associative memory offers the possibility of storing concrete and
abstract images with a very large number of attributes that can be registered,
recognized or recovered through associations. These operations are defined as
follows:
Definition 4. Memory Operations
1. Register: Let Γφ be an image in Gφ and Γψ an image in Gψ. Registering
Γψ into Γφ is defined as (“<=” is an assignment operator):
(a) Γφ <= λφ(Γφ,Γψ)
(b) Γψ <= B.
2. Recognition: Let Γφ be an image in Gφ and Γψ an image in Gψ. The
image Γψ is in Γφ if the inclusion test of the reduction operation (clause
1 of Definition 2) holds.
3. Retrieval: Let Γφ be an image in Gφ and Γψ an image in Gψ. Retrieving
Γψ from Γφ is defined as:
(a) Γψ satisfies the inclusion test in relation to Γφ
(b) Γφ <= λφ(βφ(Γφ,Γψ), Γψ)
(c) Γψ <= Γφ
Clause 1 of Definition 4 states that registering or inputing an image into
associate memory is achieved by the abstraction operation directly. Recognition
in clause 2 is achieved by testing that all the values for all arguments of the input
or clue image are contained on the memory by material implication. Finally,
retrieval is achieved by taking the clue out of the associative memory if the
inclusion test is satisfied. However, memory retrieval involves also registering
the input clue, which must be salient after a retrieval operation, and the final
state of the memory is the abstraction of the reduced memory and the input
clue. Finally, if the clue is contained in the memory the whole content of the
associative memory is placed into the output buffer, so contents in memory are
selected by cue contents in the input buffer. Such material may be used in other
associative operations. The main intuition underlying associative memories is
that contents in memory are related to cue contents directly. These are the
associations. The use of functions as the basic units of form and content allow
to model this intuition directly.
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Figure 12: Architecture for training the deep-learning network
4.1. A Case Study in Visual Memory
The memory register and recognition operations were tested with a simu-
lation experiment.5 The MNIST database of hand written digits from “0” to
“9” was used.6 Each digit is defined as a 28 x 28 pixel’s array with 256 grey
levels each and there were 70,000 instances available, where the ten digits are
mostly balanced. First, a deep neural network for classifying the digits was im-
plemented. The architecture follows closely LeCun’s proposal [23] as illustrated
in Figure 12. The network has two convolutional layers mapping the 784 (i.e.,
28 x 28) inputs corresponding to the pixels to 625 outputs. Finally, two fully
connected neural networks (FCNNs) mapping the 625 inputs to the 10 digits
respectively were also defined. The network was trained with 60,000 pictures
with a balanced number of digits.
For the experiments, the second fully connected neural network was substi-
tuted by the associative memory as illustrated in Figure 13.7 Ten associative
memory registers in a parallel array, one for each digit, were defined. Then, all
training instances of the same digit were input through an abstraction opera-
tion into the corresponding associative memory register. This input operation
involved the two convolutional layers and the first FCNN. The outputs of the
“perceptual” module were real numbers ranging between 0 and 10 and the recog-
nition experiments were run for memories with different quantized levels for the
abstraction range, from 1 to 512, using all intermediate powers of 2.
Once the memory was created the 10,000 test instances were submitted for
recognition to the ten memories in parallel, using only the inclusion test of
Definition 2. The experiment was validated through an standard 10-fold cross-
5The data and source code for replicating the experiments, including the detailed results
and the specifications of the hardware used, are available at https://github.com/LA-Pineda/
Associative-Memory-Experiments
6http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
7The architecture is analogous to the basic structure of the hybrid machine presented
by Graves et al. [14, 15] although the vectors output by the deep neural network in such
framework are read and written in external RAM memory registers, that can be accessed by
location and content, instead of associative memory registers, as in the present proposal.
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Figure 13: Architecture using a deep-learning neural network and associative memory registers
validation procedure. The averages of the precision, recall and entropy for the
10 grids are shown in Figure 14.
As can be seen, precision grows very fast according to the grid’s density, with
a value very close to 1 (i.e., 100%) with only four or eight quantization levels
(0.977 and 0.989 respectively), and it is practically 1 from 32 levels onwards.
Recall, on the other hand, is 1 for one quantized level (were all the information
is confused) and declines with the grid’s density. However, it is still very close
to 1 with four or eight quantization levels (0.986 and 0.979 respectively), with a
very good compromise between recognition and recall. The confusion matrices
also show that the rate of confusion for all digits is insignificant. In addition,
the true negative identification for all digits was almost total. The graph shows
that when the entropy is minimal everything is recalled, but precision is very
low. However, the precision grows very rapidly with a small increment in the
entropy, with a corresponding decreased in recall, but at a very reasonable rate.
Finally, if the entropy is large, recall is decreased substantially. The experiment
shows that an associative memory from 625 attributes to four to eight levels in
the domain is quite effective for encoding the abstract image of hand written
digits.
For this recognition task the fully-connected neural network produces sim-
ilarly high recognition rates, and it is possible to argue that the associative
memory is subsumed within the neural network or that memory is reduced to
perception. However, the distinction is not about performance but about cog-
nitive architecture; from this perspective it seems more natural to distinguish
these two modules of cognition and to think of an associative memory not only
as a filter or a classifier, but as a declarative storage of the concrete or abstract
images. Furthermore, recognition is achieved by computing the characteristic
function of the clue in relation to the abstraction in the memory. So, classifi-
cation is performed through abstraction and there is no need of a classification
algorithm.
Another aspect of associative memory registers is that they can hold more
than one abstract image at the same time, such that basic cells or individual
processing units contribute to the storage of more than one concept. In this
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Figure 14: Recognition experiment with the MNIST2 digit’s database
case the images are “superposed” on the medium. The average of the 10-fold
cross-validation of the precision, recall and entropy of the 10 grids used for
recognizing images with registers storing two digits instead of only one (for the
digit pairs “0” and “5”, “1” and “6”, “2” and “7”, “3” and “8” and “4” and
“9”) are shown in Figure 15. As before, the figures are satisfactory for only
four quantized levels (0.963 and 0.992); the precision is increased slightly with
very good recall until eight levels (0.974 and 0.989) and the compromise is even
better with 16 levels (0.989 and 0.979). The entropy values for these 4, 8 and
16 levels are 0.822, 1.48 and 2.22 respectively.
However, augmenting the levels increases significantly the number of ba-
sic cells or individual processing units, with the corresponding increase in the
cost of actual distributed architectures (as opposed to software simulations) or
possibly of biological arrays. Also, the entropy is increased in relation to the as-
sociative memory registers that hold only one abstract image. This can be seen
by contrasting Figures 14 and 15. The present preliminary experiment suggests
that the limit of abstract images that can be stored in an associative memory
register will depend on a maximal entropy value above which the array is sat-
urated and all the images are confused. Figure 15 shows that the operational
range is between 4 to 16 levels. The choice of the granularity of an associative
memory register will depend on a trade-off between the entropy at which the
compromise between precision and recall is optimal and the total number of
processing units of the array, which should be minimal due to their cost.
The experiments show that information can be stored in a fully distributed
or overlapped manner using a symbolic format –as opposed to connectionist
systems; that information can be stored and retrieved locally through simple
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Figure 15: Recognition experiment with two digits in the same memory
operations between adjacent cells using fully parallel processes, and that the
represented content results from the interpretation of the overall array.
5. Implications for the Theory of Computing
The present extension of the Turing Machine has implications for the theory
of computing and the way Church Thesis is understood. These are analyzed
in relation to 1) the mode of computing that is employed by the TM, which is
symbolic manipulation, and how other modes of computing can be character-
ized and distinguish from this basic sense; 2) a fundamental trade-off between
distributed and local representations, which is presented and discussed, and 3)
the notion of computing format underlying the present theory.
5.1. Modes of Computing and System Levels
The symbolic manipulation mode of computing embedded in the Turing
Machine and its difference from other modes of computing can be seen in terms
of an adaptation of Newell’s hierarchy of system levels [30]. A system level is a
level of abstraction at which a phenomenon can be studied –with its theoretical
terms and laws of behavior– independently of other system levels that analyze
the phenomenon at different levels of granularity. Newell postulated that there
is a system level, the knowledge level, which stands at the top of this hierarchy.
He claimed that the medium of this level is the knowledge itself and that the only
rule of behavior at this level is the principle of rationality. He also claimed that
there is a system level directly below the knowledge level in which knowledge is
represented formally as strings of symbols in digital computers, which is called
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the symbol level. These representations are expressed through programming
languages of all sorts and direct or cause the behavior of the computing machine.
Strings of symbols are stored in memory registers and manipulated by processing
units in a fully autonomous way, independently of human intervention. The
symbol level in turn stands on top of all system levels involving the construction
of digital computers, like the register transfer or computer architecture level, the
logic circuit level, the electronic circuit level, the device level and the physical
level –involving the physical phenomena– at the bottom.
Newell claimed that the knowledge level emerges from the symbol level in
digital computers, but here we depart from such claim –with its implications–
and only pose that the knowledge level consists on the interpretations made
by people of the symbolic structures held by computers. So, the knowledge
level in the present sense is human knowledge that can be expressed through
diverse means, like natural language, diagrams and informal descriptions of all
sorts. In this view the knowledge level involves the attribution of meanings to
symbolic structures, including the interpretation conventions of standard input
and output configurations, but the symbol level is fully mechanical and does not
involves interpretations or meanings. The knowledge level, including emergent
entities and their properties, cannot be reduced to the symbol level, but this
latter level is compositional and can be reduced to all lower system levels down
to the physical level, in accordance with Newell’s proposal.
The symbol level characterizes the mode of computing of the Turing Machine
which is symbolic manipulation as opposed to alternative modes that use specific
physical properties to compute continuous functions, like analogical computers
that model dynamical systems. Optical and quantum computers may be con-
sidered as other modes of computing in this latter sense too. Even sensors and
transducers of all sorts can be thought of as devices that compute particular
functions on the basis of diverse physical phenomena, each with a particular
mode of computing. These machines involve a reduced number of systems lev-
els: the knowledge level at which the input and output signals are interpreted
by people, the device level, which corresponds to the particular mode of com-
puting, and the physical level which involves the physical phenomena used by
the particular device.
In general, computing machines have a system level directly below the knowl-
edge level that characterizes its particular mode of computing. Such system
level is called here the functional or computational system level. The symbol
level is the functional or computational level of digital computers or TMs. Non-
symbolic modes of computing have a system level directly below the knowledge
level which is non-symbolic.
Algorithms are symbolic procedures for mapping arguments into values effec-
tively, so this notion is intrinsically tied up with the symbol level and symbolic
computation. Although sometimes computations made through non-symbolic
modes are said to be algorithmic, this use is vague and informal. For instance,
there is no well-defined sense in which an analogical computer can be said to
compute an algorithm. Physical phenomena are not computing machines by
themselves, and a device or a physical phenomenon becomes a computing en-
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gine only when its inputs and outputs are interpreted as arguments and values of
a function by an external interpreter capable to make such semantic attribution.
According to the present discussion there is an open ended number of modes
of computing, that can be exhibited by natural organisms or engineered ar-
tifacts. The Turing Machine is one of such machines of one particular mode
which is symbolic manipulation. The present distributed extension of the TM
augments the symbolic manipulation mode with indeterminate formats and the
computational entropy.
5.2. The trade-off between Distributed and Turing Machine Computations
In Shannon’s information theory the entropy is the expected value of the
amount of information in a message in a communication system. As the length
of a message is the inverse of its information content, Shannon’s entropy is
defined operationally as the average size of the length of a message. In the
present theory the amount of indeterminacy of an argument is proportional to
its possible values –in excess of one– within an abstraction, so this parameter
is analogous to the length of a message. Definition 3 computes the normalized
average of this parameter, and the computational entropy presented in this
paper is analogous to Shannon’s entropy.
In communication theory the entropy is useful to determine the capacity of
the channel so all messages can go through in the expected time. If the entropy
were not considered the capacity of the channel would have to be large enough
to pass all messages, regardless their probability, which may be very low, with
the corresponding penalty in the cost of the system as a whole. Likewise, not
considering the computational entropy is playing safe, as there is no information
loss, but security always comes with a high price.
This suggests that there is a fundamental trade-off between distributed and
Turing Machine computations. The former capture relations at the level of the
format and computations are local to the basic units of memory or processing;
for these reasons distributed representations are highly expressive –can express
large amounts of relational and qualitative information, including complex in-
dividual concepts represented through abstractions– and can be computed very
effectively; however they are indeterminate –entropic– and have to face informa-
tion loss. The standard Turing Machine, on the other hand, is information pre-
serving so computations are precise, but has to assume the compromise between
expressivity –for capturing large abstractions in language– and effective compu-
tation, the costs associated to the complexity of algorithms and the knowledge
representation trade-off [26, 25].
The trade-off between distributed and standard Turing Machine computa-
tions can be seen in relation to the entropy. The Turing Machine is simply the
case of fully determinate computations and its entropy is zero. However, it is
possible to conceive distributed formats that allow different degrees of indeter-
minacy such that there is an entropy level in which the compromise between
expressivity and tractability is satisfactory. This may be the case for natural
computations, that are massively distributed, use a very expressive format and
are carried on very fast, often in real time, and nevertheless are highly precise.
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5.3. The notion of computing format
The present trade-off helps also to clarify the notion of computing format :
it is perhaps possible to see an indeterminate format as a determinate one that
is inspected and explored through a non-deterministic process. This strategy
would require to explore a number of paths, possibly large, and to keep a num-
ber of copies of each state of the associative memory to prevent information loss.
However, the compromise between expressivity and computational costs of de-
terminate formats would have to be assumed, and hence the trade-off holds. A
computing format involves the shape of the medium, the alphabet, the scanning
protocol and the interpretation conventions –including the notation– and chang-
ing these conventions, even if the rest remains the same, changes the computing
format, and the place of the machine in the trade-off.
5.4. Implications for Church Thesis
Church Thesis states that the Turing Machine computes the full set of com-
putable functions, which corresponds to the set of functions that can be com-
puted intuitively by people, and that any other general theory or machine com-
putes the same set of functions and is equivalent to the TM for this reason. The
thesis was motivated by the need to formalize the notion of effective calculabil-
ity which was a mathematical concerned at the time –i.e., the calculations that
can be performed by people given the appropriate physical and time resources.
Church Thesis is often extrapolated into the statement that the Turing Machine
is the most powerful model of computing in any possible sense. However, this
extension is problematic because although it stands solid in relation to what
computations can be made (i.e., the set of computable functions and the impos-
sibility of computing uncomputable functions, like the halting problem) it does
not in relation to how computations are performed.
In this latter sense different machines –that may be equivalent in the set
of functions that they can compute, even if this is the full set of computable
functions– assume different trade-offs, and can be more powerful than others in a
given particular sense. Indeed, computing machines and representation schemes
are singled out by the particular trade-offs that they assume. Algorithms depend
on the computational format, and the difference between alternative theories of
computable functions, like recursive functions theory, the λ-calculus, extended
standard TMs with several tapes or grids, the Von Neumann architecture, etc.,
depends on the format that they pose and the focus of the theory. In particular,
the trade-off between distributed and standard TM computations illustrates the
strengths and limitations of the corresponding machines, despite that both can
compute the full set of computable functions. So, there is a particular sense in
which a machine can be more powerful than the standard TM due to its place
in the trade-off.
It is also unclear whether the strong version of Church Thesis applies to
machines whose mode of computing is different from symbolic manipulation.
Such devices compute specific functions or limited classes of functions, possibly
continuous, taken advantage of natural phenomena directly, and can be more
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powerful than practical implementations of digital computers in a particular
sense, like analogical or quantum computers, that make computations almost
instantly. Of course these computations can also be made by digital computers
through an appropriate discrete approximation and conform to Church Thesis in
this respect, but comparing algorithms with physical phenomena and abstract
devices with concrete ones are category mistakes. So the strong version of
Church Thesis is problematic in this sense too.
In a yet another sense, if the brain turns out to be a machine using a number
of specialized continuous devices –whose mode of computing is non-symbolic– for
the set of functions that is able to compute, that underlie all mental processes,
and if the TM fails in the end to model the same processes at an adequate level
of performance, Church Thesis would still hold in relation of the set of functions
that can be computed, but there would be a machine that is more powerful than
the TM in a fundamental way.
The distributed extension of the Turing Machine presented in this paper
does not augment the set of functions that can be computed effectively, and
conforms to Church Thesis, but it does extend the symbolic manipulation mode
of computing, supports distributed representations at the symbol level directly
and uses explicitly the trade-off between distributed and standard TM compu-
tations.
6. Implications for Artificial Intelligence and Cognition
Indeterminate formats, the computational entropy and the distributed ex-
tension of the TM have implications for diverse aspects of Artificial Intelligence
and Cognition; some of these are briefly discussed next.
6.1. Symbolic versus Sub-Symbolic Information
The standard Turing Machine has been used in Artificial Intelligence and
Knowledge Representation to express both “symbolic” and “sub-symbolic” in-
formation. The former term is used when the information is expressed through
declarative languages with a well-regimented interpretation, like logically ori-
ented knowledge-bases or semantic networks, and even logical and functional
programming languages like Prolog and Lisp, while the latter is used when
the information is expressed through algorithms or data-structures whose in-
ternal structure is opaque, like ANNs, procedural representations, genes in ge-
netic algorithms or clusters in vectors’ spaces. In this latter sense symbolic
and sub-symbolic systems are often said to be “representational” and “non-
representational” respectively.8 However, highly expressive declarative lan-
guages underlie a virtual machine, which in turn can be implemented in a more
basic virtual machine, down to the actual physical machine that implements the
computation. So, information that at certain level is taken to be symbolic can
8Although this terminology is informal and somehow contradictory; for instance, dis-
tributed and procedural representations are “non-representational”.
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be seen as non-symbolic at another lower or virtual machine, but the reduction
is well-defined and as the mode of computing is symbolic manipulation all the
information is in the end symbolic.
The distinction can be seen in terms of the knowledge representation hy-
pothesis [43]. According to this, a scheme is representational if it is possible
for an external observer –a human interpreter– to give a propositional account
of the knowledge that the process exhibits –to render such knowledge as a set
of propositions– but independently of such semantic attribution, the knowledge
is formal and causal of the behavior engendered by such process. So, reason-
ing and theorem-proving are symbolic and representational, but learning and
classifying objects through ANNs are sub-symbolic and non-representational.
In this AI sense, the functions and abstractions in the control state and the
external grid of the distributed extension of the TM, and the attribute-value
structures in the associative memory registers, can be considered sub-symbolic
information.
6.2. Connectionism versus Symbolic Cognition
Digital computers are used for developing and testing models of Cognition.
The availability of Turing’s model and the Von Neumann Architecture inspired
the symbolic model of cognition, that has a strong syntactic and semantic ori-
entation. However, this approach was questioned by Connectionism and ANNs
on the grounds that models of perception, thought and motor behavior requiere
non-symbolic distributed representations, as mentioned in the introduction of
this paper. Such criticisms have been contested by the symbolic approach due to
the limitations of connectionist systems for representing and operating on sym-
bolic structures and for storing and retrieving such structures in memory [13]
and although in principle ANNs can capture syntactic structure (e.g. [10, 24])
such kind of proposals are still very limited.
As stressed by Fodor and Pylyshyn [13] both the symbolic and the connec-
tionist paradigms are representational in the sense that the formal structures
or units of form written up on the tape or stored in memory are interpreted
as units of content. The difference is that in the former the semantic attribu-
tion is made upon linguistic expressions while in the latter it is made upon the
distributed set of nodes or neurons.
The relation between symbolic and connectionist systems has been subject
of much debate in cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind in terms of
system levels (e.g., [35]). In particular Marr proposed that an adequate expla-
nation of a psychological process involves three levels: the computational, the
algorithmic and the implementational [29]. The symbolist side sustains that
the computational level is characterized by a symbol-level representation with
a compositional syntax and semantics [13], and particular models focus on the
algorithms that manipulate such symbolic structures. Supporters of connec-
tionism argue on their part that explicit symbolic structures are not needed and
that this paradigm provides an extended class of algorithms that reflects better
the structure of natural neural networks. But the symbolist side argues back
that connectionism only provides an alternative implementation [13] –despite
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that whether there is a reduction from symbol systems to ANNs is still an open
question– and there seems to be an impasse between these opposite positions.
However, ANNs are normally simulated in TMs and although the distributed
property is described at the knowledge level through textual descriptions, for-
mulas and diagrams with their labels, the actual specification at the symbol
level is local. Hence, the distributed property itself is only simulated. From
this perspective ANNs can be thought of as virtual machines that use the TM
as their actual physical machine; consequently, ANNs have to be placed with
the standard Turing Machine in the entropy free side of the trade-off between
distributed and TM computations. To overcome this limitation, a functional or
computational system level for Connectionism –using a non-symbolic mode of
computing– that does not rely on the TM should be provided.
The connectionist side could argue at this point that ANNs model the infor-
mation processes of the brain directly, but when asked what kind of computa-
tional machine is the brain and what is its mode of computing, the answer would
have to be that it is the one described by the ANNs, incurring in circularity.
The Turing Machine, on its part, is a general theory of computable functions
that provides a physical machine, that computes functions through symbolic
manipulation.
There is also the claim that representations are not needed and that intel-
ligence can be modeled through algorithms organized in sub-summed architec-
tures [8]. This non-representational view underlies Embodied Cognition [4] and
Enactivism [12] too. These paradigms emphasize the role of the body and the
interaction with the environment in learning, experience and consciousness, and
hold that the underlying information processes are not symbolic. Hence the re-
jection of the Turing Machine. However, these approaches lack an explicit model
of computing and do not specify what is the mode of computing of the brain
or the body. Despite this, they do use ANNs and other classes of algorithms
as standard modeling tools, but as no semantic attribution is made neither to
data-structures nor to the operations performed upon them, the computational
structures and processes play an implementational role only.
The present distributed extension of the TM, on its part, do supports the dis-
tributed property and distributed models can be implemented directly in an ac-
tual machine. The superposition of the abstraction operation in the distributed
extended machine is an instance of an actual non-compositional operation. The
associative memory presented in this paper illustrates a distributed represen-
tation using an indeterminate and entropic format –that can be computed by
a fully parallel architecture through direct operations between simple process-
ing units. The machine operations change the functions and abstractions that
are computed and the machine is interactive for this reason, attending better
the concerns of Embodied Cognition and Enactivism, although it is neutral to
whether the units of form are assigned an interpretation in cognitive modeling.
More generally, the symbolic mode of computing manipulates units of form
mechanically but the semantic attribution is made by people. Whether there is
a natural mode of computing capable of making such attribution underly gen-
uine representations, feelings, emotions and consciousness. Current computing
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machines do not have the structural and/or functional elements that explain
such phenomena. If such mode of computing were ever discovered the knowl-
edge and computational system levels would be identified, and such machine
would be more powerful than the Turing Machine too.
6.3. Cognitive Architecture
The experiment in Section 4.1 suggests a cognitive architecture in which
perception is modeled through deep neural networks but concepts or images are
stored and retrieved in associative memory registers. The input and output to
perception are attributes and values that are best thought of as sub-symbolic
information in the AI sense, but the content of an associative memory register
as a whole is already symbolic and can be labeled with a symbol. In addition,
images of different modalities, like the visual and the acoustic one, can be given
the same linguistic label, such that the symbol’s content is multimodal. For this
an associative memory can be thought of as a coin with to sides, one presenting
the information of the world to perception and motor behavior sub-symbolically,
and the other presenting the same information to thought and language as fully
articulated symbols. Such architecture is consistent with Kosslyn’s proposal [22]
in which an associative memory coupled with modality specific imagery buffer
plays a central role.
6.4. Imagery
Traditional models of cognition hold that representations that are built in the
mind have a propositional or linguistic character [33]; however, there has been
claimed that in addition to propositions there are mental images [22, 37] giving
raise to the imagery debate [46]. The propositional side argues that imagery
confuses the concrete modalities of perception and/or motor behavior with the
cognitive level, which needs to be fully abstract, and that propositions reflect the
actual computing format. According to this if the linguistic format of the TM is
the only one that there is, the propositional camp is right. However, if this is one
among several possible computing formats, which may be underdetermined and
entropic, imagery is plausible. Images would reflect the actual format carried on
with the computation. In this view the functional mental representation would
be identified with the output of the perceptual stage but not with its input,
satisfying the concerns of the propositional side [33].
6.5. Propositional versus Analogical Representations in AI
An associative memory in conjunction with images also informs the old Arti-
ficial Intelligence (AI) debate between propositional and analogical representa-
tions [41, 16]. The propositional side argued that knowledge expressed through
schemes different than language, like maps or diagrams, can be reduced to
propositions. Here, the argument was that the medium, like the space, can also
be represented in a linear format, which is the format of the Turing Machine.
Methodologies and case studies for exploring this position and its limits can
be seen in [31, 32]. However, if the linguistic format is one among a range of
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possible computing formats such medium reduction is not necessary, not useful
and perhaps not possible.
6.6. The Knowledge Representations Trade-Off Paradox
The introduction of an associative memory also helps to dissolve a paradox
related to the so-called knowledge representation trade-off [26, 25]. This trade-
off states that there is a fundamental compromise between the expressive power
and the tractability of a representational language: the larger the expressive
power the less tractable. This is also a consequence of a more fundamental
computational property embedded in Chomsky Hierarchy [19] such that the
larger the expressive power of a formal language the more expensive to compute
whether a string is within its extension. More generally, as the expression of
abstractions requires a large expressive power, computing with abstractions is
hard, and sometimes impossible.
However, this conflicts with the intuition that the solution of hard problems
requires abstraction. If a problem is easy it can be solved through concrete
thinking, but if it is hard, solving it requires abstract thinking. Abstractions may
be hard to build or learn but once they are in place, thinking with them is easy.
Expert performance relies on abstractions. The paradox comes from the fact
that reasoning with abstractions is not only easier for expert thinkers but also
essential for the solution of hard problems, while the knowledge representation
trade-off states that expressing higher abstractions makes computations harder
if not impossible [32].
Chomsky’s Hierarchy and the knowledge representation trade-off assume
that knowledge is propositional and hence expressed through language, but the
inclusion of an alternative computing format, associative memory and abstract
images offer an alternative to abstract thinking. For instance, if the premises
and the conclusion of an argument were represented as abstractions in the asso-
ciative memory, verifying that the argument follows could be achieved through a
direct memory operation. From this perspective the paradox may be dissolved.
6.7. Impact on Learning and Creativity
The inclusion of an associative memory and imagery has also consequences
for learning and creativity. Information enrichment is implicit to the abstrac-
tion operation and is responsible of the generalization provided by the present
scheme, in line with other kinds of distributed representations that support some
or another form of generalization. However, information enrichment depends on
a property of the computing format in opposition to standard machine learn-
ing algorithmic techniques that rely on similarity measures, either implicit or
explicit, between the objects to be learned or classified. Also, the combination
of abstraction and reduction modify the abstract images stored in the associa-
tive memory registers, and the gain and loss of information can impact in the
generation of new concepts. The operations within the associative memory reg-
isters are not transparent and their products could be presented as ready made
objects to other layers of representation and thought.
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6.8. Natural Versus Artificial Computations
The proposal that all mental processes can be model computationally, which
was originally made explicit by Turing [45], and has inspired most work in
AI and related disciplines, presupposes the intensive development and use of
algorithms. The notion of algorithm is commonly associated to arithmetic,
algebraic or more general mathematical methods, mostly for making calculations
or resolving equations that people cannot solve naturally, without the support
of an external representation, like paper and pencil, possibly in large quantities,
and a considerable amount of time. The structure and basic set of actions of
the Turing Machine reflect this intuition very directly. Mathematical models
require algorithms, and in this setting, algorithms seem to be the only way to
make computations in practice. The invention of computing machines permitted
to take this intuition to its ultimate consequence, and computers amplify people
with the power of making extreme calculations that would be impossible to do
without mechanical artifacts, with great benefits for science and technology and
their effects in all ambits of society, as we see in the world today.
However, algorithmic computations in the format of the Turing Machine are
artificial or engineered as opposed to computations that can be performed by
people and living organisms with a developed enough neural system, which we
refer here as “natural computations”. AI and related disciplines have focused
in modeling the latter through the tools and methodology of the former. Even
artificial neural networks simulated in the Turing Machines use very costly al-
gorithms.
Nevertheless, although there have been impressive advances in algorithmic
models of natural faculties –that humans exercise without an apparent effort,
like vision, language and motor behavior– there is still a huge gap between what
higher developed animals and machines can do, and it is not even clear that
these faculties can be modeled to the human standards with pure algorithmic
force. For this, the availability of an associative memory with direct accessibility
and transparent interpretation may be essential to realistic models of natural
computing.
Scientific theories aim to be fully adequate models of the phenomenon or
phenomena that they mean to capture. In the case of computing, a very strong
current of opinion sustains that the Turing Machine provides a fully adequate
model of computing. Whether this is the case depends on the underlying notion
of computing that one has in mind. If computing is thought of as a game, like
chess, and the rules of the game are defined by the Turing Machine, the theory
of TMs is a fully adequate model of computing in the same way the rules of chess
provide an adequate model for chess. But computing is more often thought of
as a human invention and the TM as a fully adequate abstract model of all
machines that use information preserving determinate formats, that have and
will be ever designed. This is the intended sense of Church Thesis. However,
computing can also be thought of as the information processes performed by
arbitrary distributed systems, including the brains of living entities with a de-
veloped enough neural system and, consequently, as a natural phenomenon or
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phenomena whose study becomes a natural science. Humans and other animals
are very bad at computing algorithms unless they are very simple, and the al-
gorithmic power comes from machines; but at the same time, people and other
animals can make very complex natural computations with a level of compe-
tence that is largely beyond the capabilities of the most sophisticated current
machines. Hence, the strategies of natural computing may not rely in complex
algorithms. The present theory and discussion suggest to allow indeterminate
formats and to include the computational entropy towards the formulation of a
comprehensive theory that encompasses natural and artificial computing.
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